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Abstract.
Considerable recent work has reached mixed conclusions about whether and how
globalization affects the inflation‐output trade‐off and suggests that the ultimate effect of
openness on the output‐inflation relationship is influenced by a variety of factors. In this
paper, we consider the impact of exchange‐rate pass through and how pass through
conditions the effect of openness on the sacrifice ratio. We develop a simple theoretical
model showing how both the extent of pass through and openness can interact to influence
the output‐inflation relationship. Next we empirically explore the nature of these two
variables and their interaction. Results indicate that greater pass through increases the
sacrifice ratio, that there is significant interaction among pass through and openness, and—
once the extent of pass through is taken into account alongside other factors that affect the
sacrifice ratio, such as central bank independence—openness exerts an empirically
ambiguous effect on the sacrifice ratio.
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EXCHANGE‐RATE PASS THROUGH, OPENNESS, INFLATION,
AND THE SACRIFICE RATIO

1. Introduction
Does globalization affect inflation? Romer (1993) found a negative cross‐country
relationship between inflation and the degree of openness to international trade. This
sparked a number of theoretical and empirical studies on how openness affects the
inflation‐output tradeoff and how this relationship is conditioned upon possible
interactions of openness and other key aspects of the aggregate economy. Romer
suggests that greater openness to trade enhances negative terms‐of‐trade effects
resulting from domestic output expansions, thereby reducing the incentive for a central
bank to engage in inflationary policymaking, and Lane (1997) proposes that greater
trade openness reduces the potential output gains from unexpected inflation in non‐
traded‐goods sectors characterized by imperfect competition and sticky product prices.
Furthermore, Karras (1999) argues that greater indexation of nominal wages to
unexpected inflation in response to increased trade openness could also reduce the
incentive for central banks to inflate.
The explanations provided by Romer, Lane, and Karras imply that the effects of
openness on the inflation realizations operate by worsening the terms of the output‐
inflation trade‐off faced by central banks. Temple (2002), however, has suggested that
there is little cross‐country evidence that increased trade openness reduces the sacrifice
ratio. Daniels, Nourzad, and VanHoose (2005) propose that once the inflation‐reducing
impact of greater central bank independence is taken into account, there is evidence in
cross‐country data that increased trade openness actually increases the sacrifice ratio, a
result consistent with Rogoff’s (2006) suggestion that increased globalization tends to
make the Phillips curve shallower. This result, Daniels and VanHoose (2006) argue, is
consistent with a view that greater trade openness exposes imperfectly competitive

firms to greater competition, thereby reducing their pricing power and effectively
increasing the observed responsiveness of output to changes in the inflation rate.
Recently, Badinger (2009) has obtained results consistent with this prediction in an
analysis of data from 91 countries over the 1985‐2004 interval.
Nevertheless, Daniels and VanHoose also point out that the ultimate effects of
increased trade openness on the sacrifice ratio hinge on a number of structural factors
likely to vary across countries. Along this same line, Neiss (2001) suggests that the
effect of openness on inflation becomes more muted—indeed, empirically
insignificant—once markups are taken into account. In addition, Bowdler (2009) finds
that the relationship between openness and the sacrifice ratio depends on the exchange‐
rate regime that is in place, and Cavelaars (2009) suggests that the nature of this
relationship likely is influenced by trade costs. Ball (2006) argues that for the United
States there is in fact no clear evidence that globalization impinges on the process by
which inflation is determined. 1
A number of recent studies examine the varying degree of exchange‐rate pass
through among economies and changes in pass‐through estimates over time. Taylor
(2000), for example, argues that changes in individual expectations regarding price‐
setting behavior has led to lower inflation and lower price margins, and, as a
consequence, reduced pass through. Gagnon and Ihrig (2004) maintain that a greater
emphasis on inflation stabilization has led to both lower mean inflation and a reduced
extent of pass through. Based on cross‐country panel estimates, Campa and Goldberg
(2005) examine the main theoretical arguments explaining cross‐country differences and
changes over time in exchange‐rate pass through. They argue that inflation
performance, nominal exchange‐rate volatility, and other macroeconomic factors play
an important but limited role in influencing cross‐country differences in pass through.
Campa and Goldberg find that changes in the composition of trade—specifically, a shift
to a greater share of manufactures in a country’s import bundle—correlates with a
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lower extent of pass through. Marazzi et al. (2005) show that, in addition to the change
in the composition of imports, the growing importance of Chinese trade may have
reduced the extent of U.S. pass through. They suggest that markets experiencing the
greatest reductions in the extent of pass through are those in which China has recorded
an increased market share. At a macroeconomic level, Flamini (2007) and Adolfson
(2007) focuses on the design of optimal monetary policy and shows that the
effectiveness of monetary policy can be conditioned upon the degree of exchange‐rate
pass through. Hence, accounting for the degree of pass through can improve monetary
policy and thereby reduce mean inflation.
Our objective here is not to add to the debate on the microeconomic or
macroeconomic determinants of the extent of exchange‐rate pass through or regarding
the optimal design of monetary policy in light of partial pass through. Instead, this
paper investigates the effect of exchange‐rate pass through on the sacrifice ratio and the
role that the extent of exchange‐rate pass through has in influencing the relationship
between the degree of openness to international trade and the output‐inflation trade‐
off. We begin by developing a simple theoretical model showing how both the extent of
pass through and the degree of openness can affect the sacrifice ratio and how these
two factors can also interact to influence the sacrifice ratio. The model illustrates how
both factors work through competing channels, which renders their overall impacts on
the sacrifice ratio theoretically ambiguous. The model also predicts that a greater extent
of pass through either enhances a positive impact or reduces a negative effect of greater
openness on the sacrifice ratio. Finally, the model indicates that the overall impact of
greater openness on the sacrifice ratio is likely to be indeterminate when considering
the competing effects of key characteristics of the economy, including in particular the
extent of exchange‐rate pass through.
Using cross‐country data spanning 20 countries for the period 1975 through
2004, we find that there is in fact evidence that the degree of pass through directly
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influences the sacrifice ratio and impinges on the impact of increased openness on the
sacrifice ratio. Specifically, a greater extent of pass through contributes to a higher
sacrifice ratio and reduces the negative effect of greater openness on the sacrifice ratio.
Additional estimates taking into account the extent of central bank independence
indicate that the net effect of greater openness on the sacrifice ratio is ambiguous.
The following section provides a theoretical explanation for interdependence of
the effects of a greater extent of pass through and an increased degree of openness on
the output‐inflation relationship as measured by the sacrifice ratio. Section 3 utilizes
cross‐country data on the extent of pass through, the degree of openness, and other
variables relevant to the determination of sacrifice ratios to evaluate the empirical
predictions forthcoming from our theoretical model. Section 4 summarizes our
conclusions.
2. A Model of Interdependence among Pass Through, Openness, and the Sacrifice
Ratio
The literature on discretionary policymaking suggests that a nation’s equilibrium
inflation rate depends crucially on two key factors: the preferences of its monetary
authority in terms of relative weights on output versus inflation and the country’s
output‐inflation relationship faced by the monetary authority. To examine the effects of
a greater extent of pass through on a nation’s output‐inflation relationship, we consider
an adaptation of the model developed in Daniels and VanHoose (2006). In the model,
there are numerous atomistic sectors, indexed i. These sectors are distributed uniformly
along a unit interval. Each sector contains large numbers of workers and firms, the
latter of which produce an identical good, which is differentiated from the goods
produced in other sectors. Following Ball (1988) and Duca and VanHoose (2000), we
assume an identical price elasticity of demand across sectors for the sake of simplicity
and tractability. A portion, Ω, of firms have workforces that contractually set nominal
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wages in advance of labor‐market clearing. In the remaining fraction, 1‐Ω, of firms,
spot labor markets determine nominal wages.
In our framework, the output produced by a given firm in sector i is
yi = αli ,

(1)

where yi is the log of output and li is the log of employment at a firm in sector i. The
demand for the output of a firm in sector i as a share of aggregate domestic output is
yi ‐ y = ‐ε ( pi ‐ p),

(2)

1

1

0

0

where y ≡ ∫ yi di is the log of aggregate domestic output; p ≡ ∫ pi di is the log of the index
of prices charged by domestic firms; and ε >1 is the price elasticity of demand.
Domestic income is determined by the quantity equation,
y = m – p,

(3)

where m is the log of the money stock and the log of velocity has been normalized at a
value of zero. The domestic nation’s income‐expenditure equilibrium condition (for a
derivation of this Cobb‐Douglas approximation, see, for instance, Canzoneri and
Henderson, 1991, or Bryson, et. al., 1993) is given by
y = η (pM + s ‐ p) + (1 ‐ β )y + β * y*;

(4)

where η is the elasticity of desired spending with respect to the real exchange rate; β
and β * , which are fractions, are home and foreign propensities to import; pM is the log of
the aggregate level of prices charged by foreign producers and invoiced in foreign
prices; s is the log of the domestic currency price of foreign currency; and y* is the log of
aggregate foreign output.
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We incorporate the extent of exchange‐rate pass through into the model along
the lines of Adolfson (2007). We assume that the aggregate level of prices charged by
foreign producers, measured in foreign currency units, pM, may deviate from the level
of prices that would prevail with full pass through, which is an index of the prices
charged by foreign firms invoiced in terms of the foreign currency, denoted p*. If the
extent of pass through is incomplete, however, producers respond to exchange‐rate
changes that lead to deviations between the foreign price and the price of the domestic
good in foreign currency units. In this latter situation, pM deviates from p*. Let 1 ‐ γ
denote the extent to which foreign producers adjust the price, in foreign currency units,
that they charge in response to these deviations from the price of the domestic good due
to changes in the nominal exchange rate, so that

p M ‐ p* = (1 ‐ γ )( p ‐ s) .

(5)

Thus, under full pass through, γ = 1, and the foreign price is equal to p*, consistent with
producer‐currency pricing. With no pass through, γ = 0, consistent with local‐currency
pricing.
If we were to specify analogous structural relationships for a foreign nation, the
result would be a two‐country framework in which y* and p* would be treated as fully
endogenous variables. In order to concentrate on a basic open‐economy setting with
the potential for incomplete pass through, we assume that foreign output and the
foreign price index are exogenous and equal to a normalized level of unity, so that y*
and p* equal zero.
Using (1) in the profit function, PiYi – WiLi , yields the labor demand function for
a firm i (with the intercept suppressed because it plays no role in our subsequent
analysis):
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lid =

- ε ( wi ‐ p) + ηγ ( s ‐ p) + (1 ‐ β )( m ‐ p)
,
α + ε ‐ αε

(6)

where wi is the log of the nominal wage for the firm.
Workers can consume both domestically produced output and foreign‐produced
goods. Consequently, labor supply to firms depends on the real wage computed in
terms of the overall price workers pay for a basket of both domestic and foreign goods,
where the consumer price index is (1 ‐ β ) p + β ( p M + s) and λ > 0 is the labor supply
elasticity:
lis = λ [ wi − (1 ‐ βγ ) p ‐ βγ s] .

(7)

For firms with or without nominal wage contracts, the full‐information, market‐
clearing wage satisfies (5) and (6) simultaneously and equals
^

wi =

[λ ( α + ε ‐ αε )β + η ]γ ( s ‐ p) + (1 ‐ β )( m ‐ p)
.
[λ ( α + ε ‐ αε ) + ε ]

(8)

Hence, this nominal wage rate, which is the wage actually paid in sector i if it is among
the share, 1‐Ω, of sectors without nominal wage contracts, depends positively on the
extent of pass through. Substitution of (8) into either (6) or (7) and the result into (1)
yields output of a noncontract firm with market‐clearing (mc) wages:
⎛ (η − βε )γ ( s ‐ p) + (1 ‐ β )( m ‐ p) ⎞
yimc = αλ ⎜
⎟.
[λ (α + ε ‐ αε ) + ε ]
⎝
⎠

(9)

Thus, output of firms in sectors without wage contracts responds ambiguously to an
increased degree of pass through. This ambiguity can be understood by considering the
direct and indirect effects of variations in the extent of pass through. The direct effect of
a greater extent of pass through occurs via an increase in consumer price inflation as a
consequence of higher prices of imported goods. The indirect effect of an enlarged
7

degree of pass through takes place via a change in the real exchange rate, which affects
domestic output by altering relative prices. In equation (9), a greater extent of pass
through increases the magnitude of γ and thereby raises the demand for domestic
output and thus non‐contracting firms’ demand for labor. Hence, the indirect effect of
an increased degree of pass through is a positive dependence of output on the
magnitude of γ operating through theη coefficient in the first term of the numerator of
the ratio within parentheses in (9). At the same time, however, an increase in the extent
of the direct effect of pass through boosts the level of prices of imported foreign goods,
which raises the consumer price index, induces a decline in labor supply, and thereby
tends to reduce employment and output in sectors with market‐clearing wages. Thus,
the direct effect results in a contrasting negative dependence on the magnitude of γ .
This effect operates through the βε coefficient in the first term of the numerator of the
ratio within parentheses in (9). On net, therefore, the impact of a larger degree of pass
through on output of non‐contracting firms is indeterminate.
For atomistic wage setters within the fraction, Ω, of firms in sectors with nominal
wage contracts, the contract wage is equal to the expected value of the market clearing
c
i

^ e

wage, w = w i . Hence, from (6) and (1), the output of a firm with wage contracts is
^ e

‐αε ( w i ‐ p) + ηγ ( s ‐ p) + α (1 ‐ β )( m ‐ p)
yic =
.
( α + ε ‐ αε )

(10)

Because wages are fixed in this sector, pass through affects output only through the
indirect, real‐exchange‐rate channel, through which output at firms with wage contracts
unambiguously responds positively to an increased extent of pass through. The
demand for output of domestic firms depends positively on the real exchange rate; that
is, in logs, an increase in the differential between the exchange‐rate‐adjusted index of
prices charged in domestic markets by foreign firms and the index of domestic firms’
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prices pushes up the demand for domestic output. Consequently, a greater degree of
pass through boosts the real exchange rate and raises the derived demand for labor by
domestic firms. With nominal wages set by contracts, the result is a rise in domestic
employment and hence domestic output.
Firms behave identically, so that yic = y c for all i ∈ [0, Ω], yimc = y mc for all i ∈ (Ω,
1]. It follows that y = Ω yc + (1‐Ω)ymc. Substituting from (8) and (9) and differentiating
with respect to the index of domestic firms’ prices yields
∂y Ω {α [ε ‐ (1‐ β )] ‐ αηγ } (1‐ Ω )λα [( βε ‐ η )γ ‐ (1‐ β )]
+
=
.
∂p
α + ε − αε
λ (α + ε − αε ) + ε

(11)

Under imperfect competition, there are no firm‐level supply curves and no aggregate
supply relationship. Consequently, the expression in (11) is the slope of the relationship
between the aggregate output of profit‐maximizing price‐setting firms and the overall
level of prices set by these firms. If markets are sufficiently non‐competitive, it is
feasible for this slope to be negative, because profit‐maximizing firms with considerable
monopoly power seek to restrain output substantially in order to boost prices. Hence,
computed solely with respect to an increase in the index of domestic firms’ prices, the
domestic sacrifice ratio is positive for a sufficiently large value of ε —that is, if the
degree of competition is sufficiently high.
Differentiating (11) with respect to β yields
∂(∂y/∂p)
(1 ‐ Ω )αλ (εγ + 1)
Ωα
=
+
> 0. Thus, as in Daniels and VanHoose (2006),
∂β
α + ε − αε λ (α + ε − αε ) + ε
one prediction forthcoming from this model is that, with respect to the index of
domestic firms’ prices, an increase in the extent to which the nation’s economy is open
to international trade boosts the sacrifice ratio. This is so because greater openness
renders desired expenditures on domestic output less sensitive to variations in
aggregate domestic income, which makes each firm’s profit‐maximizing price less
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responsive to a change in aggregate domestic output. As a consequence, in a more open
economy, greater variations in output will be observed for given variations in the index
of prices charged by domestic firms.
Differentiating (11) with respect to γ yields
⎛ (1 ‐ Ω )λ (α + ε − αε )βε ‐ [ λ (α + ε − αε ) + Ωε ]η ⎞
∂(∂y/∂p)
= α ⎜⎜
⎟⎟ , the sign of which is
α
ε
αε
∂γ
+
−
⎝
⎠
indeterminate. Note that in this expression, if Ω =1, so that all sectors of the economy
∂(∂y/∂p)
< 0 follows unambiguously. In this special
utilize nominal wage contracts,
∂γ

case, a greater extent of pass through makes the index of prices charged in domestic
markets by foreign firms less sensitive to variations in the real exchange rate brought
about by changes in prices charged by domestic firms, which makes the demand for
domestic output less sensitive to variations in the index of domestic firms’ prices. Thus,
a larger degree of pass through reduces the sacrifice ratio in an all‐contracting economy.
In the more general case in which 0 < Ω < 1, however, the previously discussed
conflicting effects of increased pass through on outputs of firms in non‐contracting
sectors influences the overall responsiveness of domestic output to an increase in the
index of domestic firms’ prices. As a consequence, in an economy made up of both
sectors with nominal wage contracts and sectors with market‐clearing wages, the
theoretically predicted effect of an increased degree of pass through on the sacrifice
ratio is ambiguous. Only empirical analysis could determine whether the net effect is
positive or negative.
⎛ ∂(∂y/∂p) ⎞
∂⎜
⎟
∂β ⎠
(1 ‐ Ω )αλε
⎝
In addition,
=
> 0. A greater extent of pass through
∂γ
λ (α + ε − αε ) + ε
further stimulates inflation‐induced production in market‐clearing sectors. A rise in γ
boosts the direct effect operating through the βε coefficient in the output expressions
for output of market‐clearing firms in (9) that was noted above, thus enhancing the
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impact that greater openness has on prices charged by domestic firms and their effects
on domestic output. Thus, an enlarged degree of pass through enhances the positive
effect of a greater degree of openness the sacrifice ratio.
Sacrifice ratios examined by Ball (1994) and other authors typically are computed
using CPI inflation rates, which incorporate effects of exchange‐rate variations as well
as changes in the index of prices of domestic firms. Thus, sacrifice ratios also typically
reflect variations in real exchange rates as well. From (9) and (10), differentiating
aggregate output with respect to the exchange rate yields
∂y
(1‐ Ω )λα ( βε ‐ η )γ
Ωαηγ
=
−
.
∂s α + ε − αε
λ (α + ε − αε ) + ε

(12)

This expression is ambiguous in sign but is more likely to be negative for a sufficiently
large value of ε , because under this condition the predominant effect of domestic
currency depreciation is to reduce the real wage rate and hence reduce labor supply and
output. Note that the effect of greater openness on the output impact of the exchange
∂(∂y/∂s )
(1‐ Ω )αλεγ
rate is given by
=−
< 0. Consequently, in contrast to the
∂β
λ (α + ε − αε ) + ε
positive impact that a greater degree of trade openness has on the sacrifice ratio via the
domestic price channel, increased openness has a negative effect on the sacrifice ratio
via the real‐exchange‐rate channel, and this negative impact of openness is enlarged
with a greater extent of pass‐through (a higher value of γ).
Could the negative effect of greater openness generated through the domestic
real‐currency‐depreciation channel more than offset the positive openness effect
operating through an increase in the index of prices at domestic firms? Potentially, the
answer is yes. If exchange‐rate overshooting is commonplace, for example, then a rise
in the nominal exchange rate could exceed an increase in the domestic price index. If
the degree of overshooting is regularly sufficiently large, then the net effect of openness
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on the sacrifice ratio could be negative—if the degree of pass through is also sufficiently
large.
To summarize, the impacts of both an increased degree of openness and a greater
extent of exchange‐rate pass through on the sacrifice ratio operate through opposing
direct and indirect channels. The direct, domestic‐price channel yields a positive impact
on the sacrifice ratio, and the indirect, real‐exchange‐rate channel yields a negative
sacrifice‐ratio effect. Of course, on net the overall effects of an increased degree of
openness and a greater extent of pass through operating via both channels
simultaneously is ambiguous. Furthermore, the overall effect of greater trade openness
is conditioned on interactions among the degree of openness and other key
characteristics of the economy, in particular the extent of exchange‐rate pass through.
The theoretical importance of accounting for such interactions may help to explain why
Daniels et al. (2005) and Bowdler (2009)—who fail to consider a role for the extent of
pass through—reach opposing conclusions on the effects of a greater degree of
openness on the sacrifice ratio. Thus, our empirical work that follows seeks to take into
account interactions among all of these variables.
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4. Empirical Evidence on Pass Through, Openness, and the Sacrifice Ratio

The key empirical implications of our theoretical model are as follows:
i) the predicted effect of a greater degree of openness on the sacrifice ratio is
theoretically ambiguous and can only be determined empirically;
ii) the predicted impact of a greater extent of exchange‐rate pass through on the
sacrifice ratio is theoretically ambiguous and can only be determined empirically;
iii) if the effect of a greater extent of pass through is empirically significant, an
increased extent of pass through enhances (reduces) a positive (negative) effect of
openness on the sacrifice ratio;
iv) the overall effect of greater openness on the sacrifice ratio depends on key
structural characteristics of the economy, such as the extent of exchange‐rate pass
through, and when these competing effects are considered simultaneously, the
overall impact of openness is likely to be indeterminate.
We begin the empirical analysis with the estimates of the sacrifice ratio from
Bowdler (2009). These estimates cover the period 1981 through 1998. We extend the
data in both directions, estimating the sacrifice ratio from 1975 through 2004. These
estimates are consistent with Bowdler (and hence the process of Ball 1994) and are
likewise based on data from the International Monetary Fund’s International Financial
Statistics. 2 Trend inflation is measured as average inflation over eight quarters, centered
on a given year, so that trend inflation for year t is the average over the last two
quarters of year t‐1 through the first two quarters of t+1. A disinflation period is
defined as a period in which trend inflation declines by more than 1.5 percent from a
peak to a trough. The initial level of inflation is measured at the peak and labeled
Inflation in the following data tables. The change in inflation from the peak to the

trough is labeled ΔInflation. The length of each disinflationary period (Length) is
measured in years. The sacrifice ratio, SAC, is the ratio of the reduction trend output to
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the associated change in trend inflation for a given disinflationary period. These
calculations are made for 20 advanced economies resulting in 69 observations.
We augment this data with a measure of the degree of trade openness,
Openness. We follow the literature by measuring the degree of openness as the

average of the annual ratio of imports to GDP over the entire sample period. This
measure is taken from the World Development Indicators. For the reasons spelled out by
Daniels et al. (2005), we also include their measure of central bank independence, CBI,
derived from Franzese (2002). A measure of the duration of wage contracts, WDUR, is
taken from Temple (2002), whose original source is Bruno and Sachs (1985). Lastly, we
include Campa and Goldberg’s (2005) estimates of the extent of nominal exchange‐rate
pass through, Pass Through, elasticity spanning the period 1975 through 2003. We use
this measure because, as Campa and Goldberg argue, their elasticity measure has a
direct economic interpretation and is the most relevant measure of the impact of
exchange rate changes on inflation performance. Specifically, their estimates reflect the
impact of a one‐percent fluctuation of the nominal exchange rate on import prices,
which correspond to prices denoted pM in the theoretical model presented in the
previous section. Hence, a pass‐through estimate of 0.62 (the mean value in our sample
of countries) implies that a one percent depreciation of the domestic currency would
result in a 0.62 percent increase in the import price index of the domestic country. The
authors provide both short‐run estimates (quarterly pass through) and long‐run
estimates (annual pass through). We use the latter, because it is consistent with our
annual estimates of trend inflation and the sacrifice ratio. Note that the measures of the
degree of openness, the level of central bank independence, wage duration, and the
extent of pass through are all time invariant. All regression models are ordinary least
squares with the various corrections and controls listed below. Descriptive statistics
and the countries used in the data set are provided in Table 1.
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Due to the number of observations and the nature of the data set, Daniels et al.,
and Bowdler suggest testing for potential outliers. Therefore, we first test for outliers,
running a regression with the sacrifice ratio as the dependent variable and Inflation,
ΔInflation, Length, CBI, Openness, and a constant as regressors. We use the DFITS
statistics as our criterion for the detection of outliers and, following Maddala (2001),
control for the influence of outliers using bounded influence estimation. This approach
weights potential outliers by creating a single variable in which all observations whose
DFITS statistics is less than or equal to 0.34 are coded as one and all observations whose
DFITS statistic is greater than 0.34 are coded with the value of 0.34 divided by the
absolute value of their DFTIS statistic.
The Breusch‐Pagen / Cook‐Weisberg test is used to test for heteroskedasticity,
and rejects the null hypothesis of constant variance. Hence, all of the subsequent
regression models report robust standard errors. Furthermore, following Caporale and
Caporale (2008), we also control for the clustering of error terms at the country level.
Regression Model 1 in Table 2 is a base model that includes standard
determinants of the sacrifice ratio; Inflation, ΔInflation, Length, CBI, and Openness. As
in Bowdler, the length of the disinflationary period remains a key determinant of the
sacrifice ratio. There are, however, important differences. First, the coefficient estimate
for CBI is, consistent with Daniels et al. (2005), positive and significant. Additionally,
Bowdler reports “weak” evidence linking the change in inflation to the SAC, whereas
our results are significant at the 1 percent level. More importantly, Bowdler also reports
a weak negative correlation between openness and the SAC, whereas our results are
significant at the 5 percent level. These differences are likely an outcome of the larger
data set (a longer time horizon in both directions) that we employ. Recall that the
results of the theoretical model imply that a negative effect of greater openness on the
sacrifice ratio results if the indirect, longer‐term effect operating through the real‐
exchange‐rate channel predominates over the direct, shorter‐term positive impact
15

operating through the domestic‐price channel. These results are suggestive of an
interpretation that—in the context of the more recent data explored here and by
Bowdler—the real‐exchange‐rate exchange rate channel has become empirically more
important over time.
Although our main interest is how pass through might condition the impact of
openness on the sacrifice ratio, Model 2 drops Openness and adds the Pass Through
variable to the base model to consider a potential independent effect. In Model 2, the
coefficient estimate for Pass Through is positive and statistically significant at the 6
percent level. Further, its inclusion has little impact on the sign and significance of the
other model variables. This result suggests that countries with a greater degree of
exchange‐rate pass through tend to have a larger sacrifice ratio, consistent with the
effects of variations in the extent of pass through operating primarily through the
direct, domestic‐price channel. Model 3 includes both Openness and Pass Through. The
inclusion of both variables lowers the p‐value of Openness to 1 percent and the p‐value
of Pass Through to 4.5 percent. The estimates of this model suggest that a one‐standard‐
deviation increase in the Openness measure results in a 0.37 decrease in the SAC,
whereas a one‐standard‐deviation increase in the Pass Through measure results in a
0.27 increase in the SAC. These individual effects of Openness and Pass Through on the
SAC are illustrated in added‐variable plots in Figures 1 and 2. Figure 1 plots the
residuals of a regression of Openness (as the dependent variable) on all other model
variables against the residuals of a regression of the SAC (as the dependent variable) on
all other variables except Openness, thereby isolating the impact of Openness on the
SAC. Figure 2 provides the corresponding plot for Pass Through.
Model 4 includes an interaction term between Pass Through and Openness. Our
theory suggests that a greater extent of exchange‐rate pass through enhances an output
expansion generated by a higher price level in nominal‐wage‐contracting sectors,
boosting the positive impact of a greater degree of openness on the sacrifice ratio via the
16

direct channel. 3 Consistent with this theoretical prediction, the estimated coefficient on
this interaction term is positive and statistically significant. Note that the estimated
total marginal effect of Openness on the sacrifice ratio in Model 4 is the sum of the
coefficient on Openness plus the coefficient on the Openness‐Pass Through interaction
term times a given value for Pass Through. Evaluated at the mean value for Pass
Through, the total estimated marginal effect of Openness on the sacrifice ratio remains
negative and statistically significant. Figure 3 illustrates the total marginal effect of
Openness on the SAC, taking into account the interaction with Pass Through. Figure 3
also includes the point estimates for each individual country given in light of each
nation’s unique measure of Pass Through (plotted on the right‐hand axis), along with a
histogram of the Pass Through measures (plotted on the left‐hand axis). For reference
purposes, the individual marginal effect of Openness on the SAC is illustrated by the
solid horizontal line.
Model 5 drops the interaction of Pass Through and Openness and controls for a
potential interplay between CBI and Openness, as suggested by Daniels et al. Once this
interaction is taken into account, the coefficient estimate for Openness is no longer
statistically significant. This finding is consistent with the more recent results of
Bowdler as well as the theoretical model presented here. 4 Models 3 and 4 suggest that
the overall impact of openness on the sacrifice ratio depends on interacting structural
parameters of the macroeconomy. Once the full scope of such interactions is taken into
account, the impact of Openness on the sacrifice ratio becomes ambiguous.
Though not considered in the theoretical model, Model 6 drops the interaction of
Pass Through and Openness and controls for a potential interaction between CBI and
Pass Through. Daniels et al. (2005) suggest that greater CBI leads to greater nominal
wage contracting and, therefore, a larger sacrifice ratio. Greater CBI and greater
nominal wage contracting would also leave less scope for exchange‐rate pass through to
independently exert a positive influence on the sacrifice ratio. This conclusion suggests
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a negative coefficient estimate for the CBI‐Pass Through interaction term. The estimate
of the interaction term is indeed negative and statistically significant, providing some
empirical support for this argument.
In addition to the empirical models summarized in Table 2, we also examined
the role of wage contracting by considering a model that includes the wage duration
measure described above (WDUR) and interactions of that measure with the Pass
Through measure. The coefficient on the wage duration variable in this revised model
turns out to be positive but not statistically significant, and the coefficient on the
interaction term is insignificant. The only impact of including the wage duration in the
model is to reduce the level of significance for the Pass Through measure (the p‐value
for this revised model turns out to be slightly outside standard levels of significance for
a two‐tailed test). Including the wage duration measure (from Temple 2002), which
exhibits little variation across the sample of countries and does not cover the full sample
of countries (omitting Ireland, Norway, Portugal, and Spain), reduces the sample size to
55 observations. Hence, we do not take our results as indicating that there is no
interaction with the extent of pass through or other key structural characteristics and
the degree of wage contracting. Rather, we see further study of the importance of the
degree of nominal wage rigidity as a conditioning factor to be a potentially important
path for future research.
A model that omitted potential outliers was also considered by using a standard
threshold for the DFITS statistic of 2 times the square root the number of independent
variables (k) divided by the number of observations (n), 2∙(k/n). Based on this threshold,
we identify two outliers, Finland (1989‐1996, also identified as an outlier by Bowdler),
and Italy (1977‐1978, which was not included in Bowdler’s sample). For these two
observations, Finland had an exceptionally large sacrifice ratio (10.529, which is more
than two standard deviations greater than the mean), and Italy exhibited a very large
drop in inflation of 13.57 percent over only a one‐year disinflationary period. These
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results are provided in Table 3 which indicates that standard measures of model fit
were lower under this approach and that there were no noteworthy differences in the
sign and significance of our variables of interest.
Finally, Bowdler suggests the impact of the degree of openness and its
interaction with the level of central bank independence may have changed along with
monetary‐policy making after 1980. In light of this suggestion, we also introduced a
single dummy variable to evaluate the effect of our inclusion of the earlier sample
period, coding years 1975 through 1980 as one and all subsequent years as zero. The
coefficient estimate for this variable was statistically insignificant, and its presence had
no impact (other than to reduce the p‐value on both Openness and Pass Through) on
our general conclusions.
4. Conclusion

Considerable recent work has reached mixed conclusions about whether and
how globalization affects the output‐inflation relationship. In this paper, we have
explored the implications of a simple theoretical model allowing for the variations in
extent of exchange‐rate pass through and the degree of trade openness to exert
simultaneous impacts on the output‐inflation trade‐off. This model predicts that both
factors should have interacting effects on the sacrifice ratio. Examination of the
interaction among measures of the degree of openness, the extent of pass through, the
level of central bank independence, and other factors influencing the sacrifice ratio in
cross‐country data verifies the empirical importance of the predicted interactions. On
net, our results indicate that a greater extent of pass through increases the sacrifice ratio.
Furthermore, once the extent of pass through is taken into account alongside other
factors that affect the sacrifice ratio, the degree of openness to international trade tends
to have an empirically indeterminate effect on the sacrifice ratio.
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Thus, our results suggest that considerable work must be done to better
understand whether and how greater openness influences the output‐inflation
relationship. In light of the numerous structural factors that can impinge on the
potential relationship between the degree of openness and the sacrifice ratio, it may be
appropriate for future studies of this relationship to focus attention on evidence
revealed from time‐series data from individual countries instead of cross‐country data.

20

REFERENCES
Adolfson, Malin, 2007, Incomplete exchange rate pass‐through and simple monetary
policy rules, Journal of International Money and Finance, 26(3), April, 468‐494.
Badinger, Harald, 2009, Globalization, the output‐inflation trade‐off, and inflation,
European Economic Review, 53(8), 888‐907.
Ball, Laurence, 2006, Has globalization changed inflation? NBER Working Paper 12687,
November.
Ball, Laurence, 1994, What determines the sacrifice ratio?, in Monetary Policy, edited by
N.G. Mankiw, pp. 155‐182, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Ball, Laurence, 1988. Is equilibrium indexation efficient? Quarterly Journal of Economics
103, 299-311.

Barro, Robert, and David Gordon, 1983, A positive theory of monetary policy in a
natural rate model. Journal of Political Economy 91, 589‐610.
Bowdler, Christopher, 2009, Openness, exchange rate regimes, and the Phillips curve.
Journal of International Money and Finance, 28(1), 148‐160.
Bruno, Michael, and Jeffrey Sachs, 1985. Economics of worldwide stagflation. Harvard
University Press, Cambridge, MA.
Bryson, Jay, Henrik Jensen, and David VanHoose. 1993. Rules, discretion, and
international monetary and fiscal policy coordination. Open Economies Review 4
(2), 117‐132.
Campa, José Manuel, and Linda S. Goldberg, 2005. Exchange rate pass‐through into
import prices, The Review of Economics and Statistics, 87(4), 679‐690.
Canzoneri, Matthew, and Dale Henderson, 1991, Monetary Policy in Interdependent
Economies: A Game Theoretic Approach. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
Caporale, Barbara, and Tony Caporale, 2008. Political regimes and the cost of
disinflation, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 40(7), 1541‐1554.

21

Cavelaars, Paul, 2009, Does globalization discipline monetary policymakers? Journal of
International Money and Finance, 28(3), 392‐405.
Daniels, Joseph, and David VanHoose, Forthcoming, Trade openness, capital mobility,
and the sacrifice ratio, Open Economies Review.
Daniels, Joseph, and David VanHoose, 2006, Openness, the sacrifice ratio, and inflation:
Is there a puzzle?” Journal of International Money and Finance, 25, 1336‐1347.
Daniels, Joseph, Farrokh Nourzad, and David VanHoose, 2005, Openness, central bank
independence, and the sacrifice ratio, Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 37,
371‐379.
Duca, John, and David VanHoose, 2001, The rise of goods‐market competition and the
fall of wage contracting: endogenous wage contracting in a multisector
economy. Journal of Macroeconomics 23, 1‐29.
Duca, John, and David VanHoose, 2000, Has greater competition restrained inflation?
Southern Economic Journal 66, 479‐491.
Flamini, Alessandro, 2007, Inflation targeting and exchange rate pass‐through, Journal of
International Money and Finance, 26(7), November, 1113‐1150.
Franzese, Robert, Jr., 2002, Macroeconomic Policies of Developed Democracies, Cambridge,
UK: Cambridge University Press.
Gagnon, Joseph E., and Jane Ihrig, 2004, Monetary policy and exchange rate pass‐
through, International Journal of Finance and Economics, 9(4), October, 315‐338.
Gruben, William, and Darryl McLeod. 2004. Capital market liberalization, disinflation,
and commitment. Manuscript, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas and Fordham
University.
Gruben, William, and Darryl McLeod. 2002. Capital account liberalization and
inflation. Economics Letters 77, 221‐225.
Karras, George, 1999, Openness and the effects of monetary policy. Journal of
International Money and Finance 18, 13‐26.
22

Lane, Philip, 1997, Inflation in open economies. Journal of International Economics 42,
327‐347.
Loungani, Prakas, Assaf Razin, and Chi‐Wa Yuen. 2001. Capital mobility and the
output‐inflation trade‐off. Journal of Development Economics 64, 255‐274.
Marazzi, Mario, Nathan Sheets, Robert Vigfusson, Jon Faust, Joseph Gagnon, Jaime
Marquez, Robert Martin, Trevor Reeve, and John Rogers, 2005, Exchange rate
pass‐through to U.S. import prices: some new evidence, Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System, International Finance Discussion Papers, Number
833, April.
Neiss, Katharine, 2001, The markup and inflation: Evidence in OECD countries,
Canadian Journal of Economics 34, 570‐587.
Razin, Assaf, and Prakash Loungani, 2005, Globalization and equilibrium output‐
inflation trade‐offs. NBER Working Paper 11641, September.
Razin, Assaf, and Chi‐Wa Yuen. 2002. The ‘new Keynesian’ Phillips curve: Closed
economy versus open economy. Economics Letters 75, 1‐9.
Rogoff, Kenneth, 2006, Impact of Globalization on Monetary Policy, Federal Reserve
Bank of Kansas City Jackson Hole Conference, August.
Romer, David, 1993, Openness and inflation: Theory and evidence,” Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 108, 869‐903.
Taylor, John B., 2000, Low Inflation, Pass‐through, and the Pricing Power of Firms,
European Economic Review, 44(7), June, 1389‐1408.
Temple, Jonathan, 2002. Openness, inflation, and the Phillips curve: a puzzle. Journal
of Money, Credit, and Banking 34 (2), 450‐468.

23

Table 1
Descriptive Statistics for 20 Countries, 1975‐2004a
Variable
Mean
St. Dev.
Min
Max
SAC
1.417
1.836
‐1.851
10.529
Inflation
9.986
5.964
1.271
27.586
ΔInflation
6.158
4.232
1.529
17.995
Length
4.464
1.960
1
11
Openness
31.308
14.088
10.08
65.61
CBI
0.453
0.196
0.150
0.931
WDUR
1.382
0.782
0
2
Pass Through
0.617
0.314
0.06
1.13
a

Obs.
69
69
69
69
69
69
55
69

Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and
United States.
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Table 2
Sacrifice Ratio Estimates for 20 Countries, 1975‐2004a
Bounded Influence Estimation
(Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses)

Length
Inflation
ΔInflation
CBI
Openness

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

Model 6

0.6915***
0.1008
0.0409
0.0343
‐0.2233***
0.0663
1.4726**
0.5732
‐0.0314**
0.0125

0.6587***
0.0910
0.0381
0.0307
‐0.2134***
0.0581
1.4738**
0.5972

0.6654***
0.0964
0.0361
0.0346
‐0.2150***
0.0636
1.4294**
0.5196
‐0.0266***
0.0091
0.8657**
0.4031

0.6599***
0.1063
0.0267
0.0375
‐0.2027**
0.0720
1.3965**
0.5455
‐0.0582***
0.0119
‐0.9089
0.5604
0.0538***
0.0164

0.6633***
0.0971
0.0295
0.0349
‐0.2074***
‐0.0645
3.6094**
1.5627
0.0094
0.0276
0.9090**
0.4241

0.6643***
0.0969
0.0305
0.0360
‐0.2087***
0.0651
2.8324***
0.6522
‐0.0267**
0.0094
1.7919***
0.4510

Pass Through

1.1704*
0.5961

PT∙Openness
CBI∙Openness

‐0.0758
0.0548

CBI∙PT
Constant

Observations
R‐squared
R‐Bar
F

5.7812***
1.6020

4.1804**
1.5421

5.4072***
1.4850

6.7422***
1.7476

4.4495***
1.4111

‐2.1474**
0.8515
4.8563***
1.4206

69
0.6768
0.6455
14.63

69
0.6581
0.6250
13.59

69
0.6965
0.6617
12.72

69
0.7164
0.6786
16.93

69
0.7004
0.6605
11.39

69
0.7013
0.6615
12.23

* Significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 1% level, for two‐tailed test.
a

All models control for clustering at the country level.
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Table 3
Sacrifice Ratio Estimates for 20 Countries, 1975‐2004a
Omitted Outliers Estimation
(Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses)

Length
Inflation
dInflation
CBI
Openness

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

Model 6

0.6286***
0.1228
0.0626
0.0510
‐0.1948*
0.1003
1.0491*
0.5391
‐0.0205***
0.0059

0.6233***
0.1282
0.0659
0.0531
‐0.1995*
0.1016
1.0748*
0.5257

0.6177***
0.1223
0.0611
0.0519
‐0.1921*
0.1011
1.0233*
0.4932
‐0.1760***
0.005
0.4849**
0.2299

0.6089***
0.1259
0.0548
0.0544
‐0.1813
0.1059
0.9942*
0.5273
‐0.0322***
0.0074
‐0.3380
0.4514
0.0247**
‐0.0099

0.6177***
0.1240
0.0610
0.0538
‐0.1920*
0.1039
1.0761
1.4167
‐0.0167
0.0242
0.4859**
0.2301

0.6177***
0.1222
0.0572
0.0538
‐0.1878*
0.1025
2.1175***
0.2943
‐0.0176***
0.0051
1.2070***
0.3212

PassThrough

0.6988**
0.3015

PT∙Openness
CBI∙Openness

‐1.1435
0.8151

CBI∙PT
Constant

Observations
R‐squared
R‐Bar
F

‐0.7854
0.6074

‐1.8568*** ‐1.1178*
0.6118
0.6110

‐0.5502
0.7768

67
0.4698
0.4254
21.34

67
0.4530
0.4082
13.52

67
0.4863
0.4254
28.81

67
0.4797
0.4180
15.37

‐1.1436
0.8151
67
0.4797
0.4709
17.75

‐1.6749**
‐0.5894
‐1.5738***
0.4577
67
0.4843
0.4231
33.71

* Significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 1% level, for two‐tailed test.
a

All models control for clustering at the country level and omit Finland (1989‐1996) and Italy
(1977‐1978) as outliers.
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Figure 1: Individual Marginal Effect of Openness
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Figure 2: Individual Marginal Effect of Pass Through
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Figure 3: Estimated Total Marginal Effect of Openness on SAC
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FOOTNOTES

1

Another branch of the literature exploring the relationship among globalization, output‐
inflation trade‐offs, and inflation focuses on the impact of increased capital mobility. Recent
examples of work in this area include Gruben and McLeod (2002, 2004), Razin and Yuen
(2002), Loungani, Razin, and Yuen (2001), and Razin and Loungani (2005). The extent to
which trade openness and capital mobility exert independent effects on the output‐inflation
trade‐off and inflation has been examined in recent work by Badinger (Forthcoming) and
Daniels and VanHoose (Forthcoming).

2

Sacrifice ratio data is available from the authors upon request.

3

In this model the total marginal effect of Pass Through is the sum of the coefficient on Pass

Through plus the coefficient on the interaction term times a given level of Openness. At the
mean value of openness and the mean value plus one standard deviation, the total marginal
effect of pass through is positive and statistically significant. At the mean value for Openness
minus one standard deviation, the total marginal effect of Pass Through is positive but not
statistically significant. For countries with relatively low levels of Openness (slightly more than
the mean minus one standard deviation), the total marginal effect of pass through on the
sacrifice ratio turns negative.
4

In this model, the total marginal effect of Openness on the sacrifice ratio is the sum of the

coefficient on Openness plus the coefficient on the interaction term times a given value of CBI.
Evaluated at the mean value for CBI and the mean value plus one standard deviation, the total
impact of openness is negative and statistically significant. At the mean value for CBI minus one
standard deviation, the total marginal effect of Openness is negative but not statistically
significant.
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